

THREAT MODELING
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IRIUSRISK

THREAT **20** MODCON **24** **LISBON**

ADVANCING THREAT MODELING CAPABILITIES TOGETHER




Layered Threat Modeling

By Roos Hubrechtsen & Michael Boeynaems

Solution threat modeling


- Created during the design or build phase of the SSDLC
- Focused on a **single** solution.
- Notations: DFDs, UML diagrams, ...
- Techniques: STRIDE, LINDDUN, ...



Assets	
ID	Description
A01	User credentials
A02	Source code
A03	Bank account information
A04	Database credentials
A05	Root credentials


Threat Actors	
ID	Description
TA01	Unauthenticated external user (Internet attacker)
TA02	Unauthenticated internal user (LAN attacker)
TA03	Malicious customer
TA04	Malicious employee
TA05	Attacker with jail-broken device

Security Controls	
ID	Description
C01	Authentication
C02	Password hashing
C03	TLS (in transit)
C04	Database encryption (at rest)



Architectural threat modeling

- Created before an SSDLC even starts;
- Higher level than solution threat modeling;
- Focused on concepts, not solutions.




Architectural threat modeling - **WHY**

- Identify transversal threats;
- Identify threats before a project even starts;
- Identify threats that impact multiple solutions;




We argue you also should threat model the (enterprise) architecture layer and we will show an example of how it is done.



Layers

The notion of layering is widely accepted by different frameworks.



TOGAF


	DATA	What	FUNCTION	How	NETWORK	Where	PEOPLE	Who	TIME	When	MOTIVATION	Why
SCOPE (CONTEXTUAL)	List of Things Important to the Business		List of Processes the Business Performs		List of Locations in which the Business Operates		List of Organizations Important to the Business		List of Events Significant to the Business		List of Business Goals/Strat	
Planner	ENTITY = Class of Business Thing		Function = Class of Business Process		Node = Major Business Location		People = Major Organizations		Time = Major Business Event		Ends/Means=Major Risk, Goal, Critical Success Factor	
ENTERPRISE MODEL (CONCEPTUAL)	e.g. Semantic Model		e.g. Business Process Model		e.g. Business Logistics System		e.g. Work Flow Model		e.g. Master Schedule		e.g. Business Plan	
Owner	Ent = Business Entity Repr = Business Relationship		Proc = Business Process IO = Business Resources		Node = Business Location Link = Business Linkage		People = Organization Unit Work = Work Product		Time = Business Event Cycle = Business Cycle		End = Business Objective Means = Business Strategy	
SYSTEM MODEL (LOGICAL)	e.g. Logical Data Model		e.g. Application Architecture		e.g. Distributed System Architecture		e.g. Human Interface Architecture		e.g. Processing Structure		e.g. Business Rule Model	
Designer	Ent = Data Entity Repr = Data Relationship		Proc = Application Function IO = User Views		Node = IS Function (Processor) Repr = Item Link = Data Characteristics		People = Role Work = Deliverable		Time = System Event Cycle = Processing Cycle		End = Structural Assertion Means = Action Assertion	
TECHNOLOGY MODEL (PHYSICAL)	e.g. Physical Data Model		e.g. System Design		e.g. Technology Architecture		e.g. Presentation Architecture		e.g. Control Structure		e.g. Rule Design	
Builder	Ent = Segment/Table/etc. Repr = Format/Key/etc.		Proc = Computer Function IO = Data Elements/Sets		Node = Hardware/System Software Link = Link Specifications		People = User Work = Screen Format		Time = Execut Cycle = Component Cycle		End = Condition Means = Action	
DETAILED REPRESENTATIONS (OUT-OF-CONTEXT)	e.g. Data Definition		e.g. Program		e.g. Network Architecture		e.g. Security Architecture		e.g. Timing Definition		e.g. Rule Specification	
Sub-Contractor	Ent = Field Repr = Address		Proc = Language Stmt IO = Control Block		Node = Address Link = Protocols		People = Identity Work = Job		Time = Interrupt Cycle = Machine Cycle		End = Sub-condition Means = Step	
FUNCTIONING ENTERPRISE	e.g. DATA		e.g. FUNCTION		e.g. NETWORK		e.g. ORGANIZATION		e.g. SCHEDULE		e.g. STRATEGY	

Zachman

	ASSETS (What)	MOTIVATION (Why)	PROCESS (How)	PEOPLE (Who)	LOCATION (Where)	TIME (When)
CONTEXTUAL ARCHITECTURE	Business Goals & Decisions	Business Risk	Business Meta-Processes	Business Governance	Business Geography	Business Time Dependence
CONCEPTUAL ARCHITECTURE	Business Value: Taxonomy of Business Assets, including Goals & Objectives, Success Factors, Targets	Opportunities & Threats Inventory	Business Value Chain; Business Strategies for Process Assurance	Organizational Structure & the Extended Enterprise	Inventory of Buildings, Sites, Territories, Jurisdictions, etc.	Time dependencies of Business Goals and Value Creation
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE	Business Attributes Taxonomy & Profile (with integrated performance targets)	Risk Management Strategy & Objectives	Inventory of all Operational Processes (IT, Industrial, & manual); Process Mapping Framework; Architectural Strategies for IT used in process support	Owners, Custodians and Users; Service Providers & Customers; Trust Modelling Framework	Security Domain Concepts & Framework	Through-Life Risk Management Framework; Attribute Performance Targets
PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE	Information Assets	Risk Management Policies	Process Maps & Services	Trust Relationships	Domain Maps	Calendar & Timetable
COMPONENT ARCHITECTURE	Inventory of Information Assets; Information Model of the Business	Risk Models, Domain Policies; Assurance Criteria (populated Assurance Frameworks)	Information Flows; Functional Transformations; Service Oriented Architecture; Services Catalogue; Application Functionality and Services	Domain Authorities; Entity Schema; Privilege Profiles; Trust Relationship Models	Domain Definitions; Inter-domain Associations & Interactions	Start Times, Lifetimes & Deadlines
MANAGEMENT ARCHITECTURE	Data Assets	Risk Management Practices	Process Mechanisms	Human Interface	Infrastructure	Processing Schedule
DETAILED REPRESENTATIONS (OUT-OF-CONTEXT)	Data Dictionary & Data Storage Devices Inventory	Risk Management Rules & Procedures; Risk Metadata	Working Procedures; Application Software; Middleware; Systems; Security Mechanisms; Process Control Points	User Interface to Business Systems; Identity & Access Control Systems	Workspaces; Host Platforms; Layout of Devices & Networks	Timing & Sequencing of Processes and Sessions
FUNCTIONING ENTERPRISE	Component Assets	Risk Management Components & Standards	Process Components & Standards	Human Entities: Components & Standards	Locator Components & Standards	Step Timing & Sequencing Components and Standards
DETAILED REPRESENTATIONS (OUT-OF-CONTEXT)	Products and Tools, including Data Repositories and Processors	Risk Analysis Tools; Risk Registers; Risk Monitoring and Reporting Tools	Tools and Protocols for Process Delivery; Application Products	Identities; Job Descriptions; Roles; Functions; Actions & Access Control Lists	Nodes, Addresses and other Locators; Component Configuration	Time Schedules; Clocks; Timers & Interrupts
MANAGEMENT ARCHITECTURE	Delivery and Continuity Management	Operational Risk Management	Process Delivery Management	Governance, Relationship & Personnel Management	Environment Management	Time & Performance Management
DETAILED REPRESENTATIONS (OUT-OF-CONTEXT)	Assurance of Operational Excellence & Continuity	Risk Assessment; Risk Monitoring & Reporting; Risk Treatment	Management & Support of Systems, Applications & Services	Management & Support of Enterprise-wide and Extended Enterprise Relationships	Management of Buildings, Sites, Platforms & Networks	Management of Calendar and Timetable

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Architecture layer

Example: a rocket
Example: BIAN

Solutions layer

Example: the Starship Megarocket
Example: Santander's solution architecture




Demonstration.

Demonstration: threat modeling a pattern

Pattern (noun)


A template describing a generic solution to a problem that occurs frequently in a given context (TOGAF 9).




Demonstration: threat modeling a pattern

Pattern (noun)


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
Architecture layer




Solutions layer




Solutions layer




Architecture layer




Solutions layer




Architecture layer




Solutions layer



Solutions layer




Architecture layer



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Solutions layer



Architectural vs Solution threats



CAPEC-151: Identity Spoofing

Attack Pattern ID: 151
Abstraction: Meta

View customized information:

Conceptual Operational
Mapping-Friendly Complete

Description

Identity Spoofing refers to the action of assuming (i.e., taking on) the identity of some other entity (human or non-human) and then using that identity to accomplish a goal. An adversary may craft messages that appear to come from a different principle or use stolen / spoofed authentication credentials.

Extended Description

Alternatively, an adversary may intercept a message from a legitimate sender and attempt to make it look like the message comes from them without changing its

Architectural threat

wishes to change what the message says. In an Identity Spoofing attack, the adversary is attempting to change the identity of the content.

- › Likelihood Of Attack
- › Typical Severity
- › Relationships
- › Prerequisites
- › Resources Required
- › Consequences
- › Mitigations
- › Related Weaknesses
- › Content History

CAPEC-49: Password Brute Forcing

Attack Pattern ID: 49
Abstraction: Standard

View customized information:

Conceptual Operational
Mapping-Friendly Complete

Description

An adversary tries every possible value for a password until they succeed. A brute force attack, if feasible computationally, will always be successful because it will essentially go through all possible passwords given the alphabet used (lower case letters, upper case letters, numbers, symbols, etc.) and the maximum length of the password.

Extended Description

Since all the possible passwords must be tried, the attack is only successful if the

passwords must be of a certain level, there is no need to check smaller candidates.

Solutions threat

passwords must be of a certain level, there is no need to check smaller candidates.

- › Likelihood Of Attack
- › Typical Severity
- › Relationships
- › Execution Flow
- › Prerequisites
- › Skills Required
- › Resources Required
- › Indicators
- › Consequences
- › Mitigations

Architectural vs Solution threats




Architectural threat

- CAPEC [Meta Attack patterns](#)
- BSI Elementary threats
- STRIDE
- 'Architectural Risk Assessment'
- ...

Solutions threat

- CAPEC [Standard Attack patterns](#)
- STRIDE
- OWASP Cornucopia
- 'Solution Threat Model'
- ...


We adopt the ArchiMate risk overlay




How to Model Enterprise Risk Management and Security with the ArchiMate® Language

A White Paper by:

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 Sebastien Massart, Arismore




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Thank you

- Threat model at architecture layer
- Use more generic threats at architecture layer
- Reuse notation, tooling, and frameworks

Time for Q&A